Horible public key tricks
The author critiques the complexity and maintenance requirements of the current SSL/TLS certificate system. They propose using 'protest certificates' with vanity public keys as a simplified, albeit unconventional, method for encrypting web traffic.
Why it matters
It highlights ongoing frustrations with internet security infrastructure and the potential for creative, if technically questionable, workarounds in web authentication.
So, I've always been somewhat annoyed at SSL/TLS. It requires everyone to go through a complex "ACME" dance just to put up a public website. Worse, certificates expire every few months, so it's not a one and done thing: even with automation, maintaining a certificate requires care to ensure the ACME client always has access to DNS records or the web server.
... and the whole system doesn't even work because certificates are issued over plaintext connections, and trusted certificate aurthorities use very secure keys like "4"
There is prior art of protest SSL implementations , but I do actually want to encrypt web traffic. Passive eavesdropping is a real risk... but preventing it doesn't require the whole certificate thing: therefore, the best choice is a protest certificate.
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